

Series II  
Subjects Files,  
1916-1973

Box 14, Folder 10

Correspondence,  
Letters received,  
1951

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Room 2517

CHK No. 18

9 April 1951

Commodore R.W. Bates, USN  
Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

I am forwarding herewith (Incl. 2) my latest translation, which contains data of probable value to your study of the background of the Leyte action on the Japanese side. The document is the daily record of the First Section (Operations) of the Japanese Naval General Staff, which summarizes briefly military developments, intelligence reports of enemy strength and dispositions, and other intelligence data as known to the top Navy command. In my preceding report dealing with the Marcus Island attack and the Ryukyus strike, I included an excerpt from this same document as one of the sources. The translation which I am forwarding you now is complete for the entire month of October 1944, and I think that you will find in it quite a bit of interesting and useful data.

(. . . CHK #1)

I am also forwarding (Incl 1) some corrections to my earlier translation of the MOGAMI Action Report. As you may recall, there were a few doubtful passages, and when I wrote to Capt. Ohmae with regard to the symbols used in the SHIGURE report, I also asked him to clear up these points. He came through with the answers, enabling me to draw up the enclosed corrections.

Mrs. Tanaka reported for duty on March 30th, and all last week I had her read herself into the general background of the Leyte battle and the action itself, study some of my translations, and also look through your Savo Island analysis, so that she will understand the approach you are taking to the Leyte study. From today, I am having her translate selected portions of the Second Demobilization Bureau monograph covering the Leyte battle, which I think will be useful for your background section. Meanwhile, I will get on with something else - probably another action report covering the Surigao battle, this time from the Shima force (Second Striking Force).

Space has now become something of a problem. Roger is letting Mrs. Tanaka work at a spare table in his office, but Capt. Morison will be down shortly, and while he is here, Mrs. Tanaka will have to move over to the administrative office next-door. It would be better if we could work together, but I'm afraid that this will have to wait until such time as the office is able to obtain more space. When this will be Heaven only knows.

Thank you for your letter of March 30. I am glad that my preceding report satisfied your needs.

Sincerely,

*Clarke H. Kawakami*  
Clarke H. Kawakami

Incl. - 2 copies, document translation  
" " correction sheet

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.  
Rm 2517

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK NO. 19

24 May 1951

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN  
U.S. Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

Thank you for your letter of the 22nd, which I have just received. I shall be interested to read your manuscript on the Nansei Shoto and Formosa strikes, and of course I shall respect your request that it not be passed around.

It will be difficult to dig up accurate Japanese data on their losses in the Formosa air strike, but I shall be on the lookout for all information thereanent. At least a rough overall idea of the Japanese plane losses is given in a 2nd Demobilization Bureau monograph, the pertinent parts of which I had Mrs. Tanaka translate as her initial assignment. This translation was completed some weeks ago, but a part of it remains still to be typed. I shall send it on to you just as soon as the typing is finished. This translation should be very useful to you in connection with the whole background phase of your study.

Mrs. Tanaka's first translation effort, as was fully to be expected, left something to be desired, and I edited it quite mercilessly. She is rapidly catching on, however, and I think you will have a good naval document translator before I am through. She is well along in her second translation now. It is one of the major source documents - the Detailed Action Report of the Mobile Force Main Body (Ozawa's Force).

I have translated some further documents on the Surigao action, this time dealing with the operations of the Second Striking Force (Shima's Force). There is, unfortunately, no action report for the Striking Force, nor are there any for the main component units: Crudiv 21 (Nachi, Ashigara) and Desron 1. For lack of the action reports, I translated the Desron 1 War Diary for the whole month of October, which contains some valuable data on both the background events and the Leyte action itself. This translation is also in process of typing. I then did a rather brief action report of one of the Desron 1 destroyers, and I am now at work on the action report of Abukuma. This will just about complete the available documents concerning the Surigao action.

The Desron 1 War Diary will give you complete information on the force which sortied from the Bungo Channel on 15 Oct. It was Shima's outfit, i.e. Crudiv 21 and Desron 1 (less Desdiv 21) - 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 4 DD. The story of how it finally winds up tailing Nishimura into Surigao is really fascinating, as you will see.

Sincerely,

*Charles V. Kawakami*

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Rm 2517

CHK NO. 20

4 June 1951

Commodore R.W. Bates, USN  
U.S. Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

I am sorry that Roger and I had to dash off after seeing the Midway film without talking with you. I thought that the film was very well done, and I have no criticisms of great importance to offer. I only felt that the brief exposition of Japanese strategic plans, though essentially correct, left something to be desired, and that, in the discussion of the Japanese tactical plans for the Midway Operation, the nature of the so-called Main Body was not made sufficiently clear. People viewing the film are liable to get the impression that the designation "Main Body" means this was the main body of the Midway attack force, which it was not. In fact, it was the "Main Body, Combined Fleet", with the primary mission of exercising overall command of the operation. I believe this was also done in the Pearl Harbor operation.

Typing of one of the completed translations was finished Friday morning, and I took it to the Pentagon with me in the afternoon with the idea of handing it to you after the film, so that you might take it back to Newport with you. Since I failed to do this, however, I am forwarding it herewith. This, as I mentioned in my last letter, is Mrs. Tanaka's first translation. I have been anxious to get it up to you because it deals with the background of the Leyte action and will provide you with considerable information necessary to the present phase of your research.

I hope that typing of the Desron 1 War Diary for October 1944 will be finished shortly also. This document also contains quite a bit of data pertinent to the background phase.

Thank you again for the brandy. I have not opened it as yet, but when I do, will raise my first glass to your health and the success of the Leyte project.

Sincerely,

*Clarke H. Kawakami*  
Clarke H. Kawakami

- 1 Incl.  
2 copies, Japanese document translation

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Rm 2517

CHK No. 21

6 July 1951

Commodore R.W. Bates, USN  
U.S. Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

This is just a hasty note to accompany some translations, typing of which has at last been completed by Capt. Renken's office. This typing job aggregating 22 standard-size pages (I am only forwarding you half of it herewith) took practically one whole month, and the typing was so sloppily done that I have had to spend hours copyreading it and making corrections on all copies. If this is a sample of what we will get from Capt. Renken's typists in future, both as regards time taken and quality of work, I feel that we are still as far as ever from a satisfactory solution of the problem. Clumsy as it would be, it might be ~~preferable~~ preferable for me to send up the overflow of our translations to you in manuscript, so that they can be typed up there. It would be necessary, then, to return the typed copies to me for copyreading, but this would not involve more than a few days delay, and I am sure that from your typists we would get more careful work. I sent along to Renken's office, when we sent over the manuscripts for typing, a sample typed-copy of an earlier translation to use as a guide for format, etc. I nearly blew my top this morning when I received the finished typing and saw that they had not followed the sample at all, leaving no space at the top for binding, etc.

I have been working on the queries contained in your manuscript and hope to send it back to you sometime during the coming week with what answers I have been able to get. I have had no success worth mentioning in uncovering additional source documents covering the Japanese air operations, particularly Army. I am afraid that we are up against a stone wall here. I shall have more to say on this subject in my report accompanying your manuscript.

Roger informs me that he suggested to you, and that you approved, an arrangement whereby I may take a week's leave with pay. I appreciate this kind offer and will certainly avail myself of it as soon as I get some more of the translations out of the way.

Sincerely,

Clarke H. Kawakami

Incl.

- 2 copies, ABUKUMA Action Report translation, with appended charts
- 2 copies, Desdiv 18 Action Report translation

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Rm 2517

CHK No. 22

16 July 1951

Commander P.E. Hartmann, USN  
Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commander,

I gather that Commodore Bates was a bit upset at the news concerning the impending expiry of my contract and my somewhat uncertain frame of mind about renewing. Curiously enough, he doesn't appear the least bit worried about getting the necessary funds to take care of a possible renewal, so I presume that he either has that angle already worked out or is confident that it will be.

The Commodore, in a letter to me dated the 11th, expressed surprise at my hesitation to renew the contract, and he apparently believes that my hesitation stems partly from a lack of enthusiasm about the project and partly from a sort of hangover from our past disagreements. I trust that you will assure him that such is not quite the case. Though technical naval matters are somewhat out of my line, I do take a considerable interest in researching the Japanese side of the Leyte battle and am anxious that my work will contribute toward making the Commodore's study one of the best and most complete that he has done. Naturally, I would like to complete the job to the end rather than leave it half-finished.

Also, though I still feel that my job should be more research and less translation, I don't want the Commodore to ascribe my hesitation about renewing to our differences on this point. These, I think, can be ironed out as we go along.

My reasons for hesitating have entirely to do with my own personal circumstances. When I undertook the job last year, I understood that it was temporary, and since it would allow me freedom to attend to other matters that then demanded my attention, it fitted in very nicely with my needs. Now, these other matters have been more or less taken care of, and I am in a position where I should get into some regular work with some degree of permanency and carrying an adequate remuneration consistent with my needs and my qualifications. I am sure that the Commodore will understand that my present salary is hardly adequate to live on in Washington, with a wife and three kids to look after. As for the qualifications side of it, the Commodore knows that I held a GS-14 position in the G-2 Historical Section in Tokyo, and I believe I told you during your recent visit that last fall I was approached by the Voice of America to take a GS-13 position in New York as Chief of their Japan Desk. I am confident, therefore, that I can find a position in Washington which will meet my requirements.

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The Commodore indicated in his letter that Captain Rochefort would be coming down here to talk things over with me. I am looking forward to meeting him, and I think that I can explain the situation to him more fully in a personal talk than I can by letter. I presume that the Commodore, since he will be gone until almost the date of expiration of my contract, has asked Captain Rochefort to handle the matter of the contract renewal and obtaining new funds.

I shall continue turning the whole thing over in my mind pending Captain Rochefort's arrival, and perhaps by the time he comes I will have a firmer idea of the terms on which I would be willing to continue. Since I hope to take the week's vacation offered me by the Commodore shortly, I would very much appreciate it if you would let me know as soon as possible when I can expect Captain Rochefort. I can then plan my vacation accordingly.

Roger and I carried out another raid on the National Archives the other day, and I came away with every remaining Japanese naval air document I could find that might conceivably shed light on the Formosa and Leyte battles. I still despair, however, of obtaining a complete overall picture of the air operations from these piecemeal unit reports. And of course, there is still the problem of the Army air.

Please relay my best wishes to the Commodore, and tell him that I shall honestly do my best to stick with the job as long as I can.

Sincerely,

  
Clarke H. Kawakami

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.  
Rm 2517

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK No. 23

20 August 1951

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN  
Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

I meant to write you last week to report that the new contract had been duly signed, but Roger and I were hotfooting all over Washington and the surrounding countryside in another attempt to track down some of the mysteriously missing Japanese documents. More about that in a minute.

The contract was signed on the 13th, effective from that date, the old one having run out on the 11th. The new document is the same as the old contract, except that the total sum of money for the job is now \$6,000 instead of \$5,000. The provision for termination by either party is unchanged.

Since the contract stipulates only a total sum, it is again necessary for us to agree on the amount I am to receive for each two-week work period. Hitherto I have been receiving \$200, which meant that the total \$5,000 of funds covered 50 weeks. On the same 50-week basis, the new sum of \$6,000 would work out at \$240 per two-week period. On a 48-week basis, it would work out at \$250. For the reasons which I have already mentioned to Commander Hartmann and Captain Rochefort, I hope that you will be agreeable to the latter figure. Though this means that the \$6,000 will cover only 48 weeks, actually there is a reasonable possibility that the work can be completed in less time than that since I have just about exhausted all possibilities in searching for source documents and do not expect to uncover much more than I already have collected.

So much for the new contract and the financial arrangements to be made thereunder. I am most appreciative of your efforts and those of Captain Rochefort to make it financially possible for me to continue with the project, and I hope that I shall be able to see it through to completion.

It was very pleasant and profitable to meet Captain Rochefort and discuss with him our problems. I am sorry that he couldn't stay longer, but I trust that he will be coming down occasionally from now on, so that we can keep more closely in touch and iron out problems that arise.

One of the matters touched upon during Captain Rochefort's visit was that of the several key documents which we know were once in CIA's possession but which now are mysteriously missing. Following a further fruitless search in the National Archives, Roger and I last week got on the trail of two batches of documents which CIA sent out destined for the Archives

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but which never got there. We finally located one batch out at a new annex of the Government Records Center in northeast Washington. We went through some 40 odd boxes of stuff and turned up some missing naval documents, but not the ones, unfortunately, that we were looking for. We also located the second batch, and Roger and I and Mrs. Tanaka will go through it as soon as we can. If the missing documents fail to turn up there, I am afraid that we will have to give up. So far, Roger and I have had to do all the searching ourselves, with virtually no effort or assistance on the part of CIA. It has, needless to say, consumed a lot of valuable time. Should our final effort prove unsuccessful, I think - as Captain Rochefort suggested - that something should be done to make CIA track down the missing documents.

I have thoroughly searched the Archives for documents on the air phase. I have gathered quite a bit of stuff covering the naval air operations, and Mrs. Tanaka is already at work on some documents showing the land-based searches being carried out by the Japanese in the first part of October. I also have uncovered a little material concerning naval air units on Okinawa at the time of the Ryukyus strike, and some unit action reports covering Japanese air attacks on Halsey off Formosa.

On the Army air side, I couldn't find anything in the Archives. However, in going through some microfilmed Japanese material received by the Army Historical Division from Tokyo recently, I found one source containing quite a bit of useful stuff on the Fourth Air Army. I got this photostated and now have it here to work on. It contains operations orders and some data on strength and dispositions of Army air units, but there are no actual action reports, as there are for Navy air units.

I have a couple of translations of documents on the surface operations (Mobile Force Main Body) which I hope to put into final shape for typing shortly. However, I think it best that we drop the surface phase for the time being and devote ourselves entirely to the air documents. This is essential in order to provide the answers to queries in your manuscript concerning Halsey's operations up to 14 October. I have been holding this up because of the new documentary material I discovered bearing on the subject.

I trust that this brings you generally up to date on what we have been doing and how we plan to proceed. If you or Captain Rochefort have any suggestions to make concerning the handling of the air side, or any special points of interest, please let me have them.

I hope that your vacation trip to the West Coast was most enjoyable.

Sincerely,

*Clarke H. Kawakami*  
Clarke H. Kawakami

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Rm 2517

5 Sept 1951

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN  
U.S. Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

Thank you for your letter of 31 August, which I received only yesterday. I appreciate your ready acceptance of my proposal on the matter of pay, and all necessary arrangements have been made with Captain Stewart to put it into effect.

Re the matter of Japanese air searches, Mrs. Tanaka has completed translations of two documents covering searches carried out by the 708th Attack Unit of the 762nd Air Gp (Sixth Base AF) in the Q Patrol Sector (from KANOYA) from 4 to 11 Oct and in the Fs Patrol Sector (from SHINCHIKU or KEELUNG) from 1 to 17 Oct. I am readying these for typing and will get them up to you as soon as possible.

Pursuant to my talks with Capt. Rochefort, I have been trying to work out an overall picture of the Japanese air force organization, dispositions and strength as of about 10 October. This is quite a difficult task in view of the incompleteness and helter-skelter nature of the available sources. Much as in the case of the surface forces, I have had to start with the organization and dispositions laid down by Combined Fleet in early August, and then ascertain what changes took place between then and October. I will forward you some stuff on this shortly.

Since we have next to nothing on the Army air forces, especially in the Formosa and Okinawa areas, I think that it will be necessary to work up some questions to send to Tokyo. However, Commodore, I am afraid that all you can expect is very rough answers, since I am positive that no actual operational records are available in Tokyo either. Interrogation of former Army air officers undoubtedly can provide us with some rough idea of the organization and dispositions, but we can't expect to get any accurate and detailed strength figures or data on searches, etc. on specific days. That side of it is going to be very rough indeed.

I hope that Capt. Rochefort will be able to come down again in the near future, so that we can put our heads together on this vexing problem of the Japanese air operations.

Roger (just back from a cruise up north on Morison's yacht), Mrs. Tanaka and I are going over today to ferret through the last batch of Japanese documents in which we might find some of the missing material we have been searching for so long.

Sincerely,

*Clark H. Kawakami*

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Rm 2517

CHK No. 24

18 Sept 1951

Commodore R.W. Bates, USN  
U.S. Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

I am forwarding you herewith translations of four documents covering air operations. Two of them cover searches, from KANOYA and SHINCHIKU respectively, during October 1944. One covers the 10 Oct strike on OKI-NAWA, and the last deals with the opening of the FORMOSA strike on 12 Oct.

With regard to the two search reports, I was somewhat at a loss how much of the reports to translate, and whether or not to bother with the appended patrol charts which duplicate much of the data given in the report. I decided in favor of doing the charts too, largely since they will enable you to see at a glance the sectors searched on any given day covered by the reports. I also did the entire reports rather than limit the translations to the period after 9 Oct. I did this because I thought you would probably want to know what the search pattern normally was before things started popping. I will appreciate it if you and Captain Rochefort will give me any suggestions you have with a view to limiting future translations on air operations as far as possible. There are quite a slew of documents, and unless we translate only what you absolutely need, we are going to get bogged down.

In conjunction with these search reports, I want to call your attention to Part VIII of the NACHI documents which contains Combined Fleet OpOrd 82, 1 Aug 44, outlining search and patrol operations for the base air forces. You will find it on p. 217 of the Part VIII volume. On p. 218, there is a table giving the letter designations of the various patrol sectors, and on the following page a diagram showing the lane-numbering system within a sector. The appended table and chart, pp. 224-5, are particularly important since they show the standard patrol dispositions in force at the time the action we are studying begins. It would appear from the table on p. 224 that we have gotten the dope on two of the four principal patrol sectors of interest in connection with the Ryukyus and Formosa air strikes. Now, if I can locate similar reports for the searches in the O (NAHA) and F (GARAMBI) sectors, we will have complete data. Please note that this table shows no naval air searches or patrols out of No. IJUZON. This strengthens my suspicion that there was no naval air strength based there, and that whatever air units were there were units of the Fourth Air Army.

So much for the two search reports. Of the other two, the OKINAWA report is the more interesting. It sheds a little light on the damage done in the 10 Oct strike - plane losses, etc. Also it indicates that the Japanese did have some suspicion that our carrier forces were about to strike somewhere in the NANSEI SHOTO area, but that the first warning of

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the actual attack on the 10th was given by the YOZA TAKE radar station at 0630, only 20 minutes before our aircraft appeared over OKINAWA. So apparently we caught them before they had flown off their morning searches. In connection with the plane losses mentioned, please note that the Action Summary section lists losses in addition to the 3 planes given in Section IV of the report. The explanation, I presume, is that the three planes listed in Section IV were the losses of the reporting unit (OROKU Detachment, 901st Air Gp) only. The Action Summary probably purports to give total losses for each of the attacks on the OROKU base.


The TORAO Air Gp report contains a few bits of useful information on the 12 Oct strike on TAIWAN. It confirms, for one thing, that a No. 1 Alert was in force from 0343 that day, indicating that the Japanese already had detected the approach of our carrier force. You will recall from the translation of the 2nd Demob Monograph I sent you some time ago that, according to that source, the TAIWAN alert was ordered after Japanese night search craft (radar-equipped flying boats from TOKO) had spotted our task groups southeast of TAIWAN.

The TORAO Air Gp report also gives some figures for Japanese plane losses. Presumably these are only for the TORAO Air Gp, however, and won't be of much use unless we can get similar figures for all units involved.

With these translations out of the way, I want to resume my research of the overall naval air dispositions and command as of 10 October. It will take me a few days to finish this up, and I will then send you a report on it. From then on, we'll just have to try and follow the various units as they get transferred from one command to another and from one area to another.

Please give my regards to Capt Rochefort and Comdr Hartmann.

Sincerely,

  
Clarke H. Kawakami

Incl.

2 copies each of 4 document translations, with appended charts

0300



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Rm 2517

CHK No. 25

1 Oct 1951

Commodore R.W. Bates, USN  
Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

It was very helpful to be able to talk over with Captain Rochefort last week various problems connected with our research concerning the Japanese air organization and operations. I hope that he will be able to pay us similar occasional visits in the future, so that we can maintain closer contact as we go along.

I handed over to Captain Rochefort what I had done to date on the subject of overall Japanese air organization as of 10 Oct 1944 - I should say, naval air. When he left on Friday, I had not yet typed up one of the supporting translations. I did that this morning and am forwarding it along herewith. This translation and those already in Captain Rochefort's hands provide the complete documentation for the table which I compiled showing the overall organization of the naval air forces as of 10 October.

I discussed with Captain Rochefort the question of what documents to tackle next, and since we need a more complete picture of the tactical organization and plans for Navy air in Sho I, I have set Mrs. Tanaka to work on some basic Second Air Fleet orders issued in Sept 1944, which turned up in the microfilm material received by the Army Hist Div from Tokyo. I shall meanwhile tackle the Fourth Air Army material I have found, so that we can try and piece that side together, too.

I trust that you are satisfied with the progress we are making down here, and that all goes well with your research on the American side.

Sincerely,

*Clarke H. Kawakami*  
Clarke H. Kawakami

Incl.

1 Japanese document translation (2 copies)

0301



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Rm 2517

CHK No. 26

17 Oct 1951

Captain J.J. Rochefort  
Special Projects Section  
Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

Dear Captain Rochefort:

I received last week the typed copies of the HYUGA report translation, together with the Japanese grid material. If you have no further need of Mrs. Tanaka's pencil translation, I would appreciate it if you would send it back to us in order to facilitate our checking the typed copies. I glanced through these hastily and noticed a few typographical errors. If you wish us to correct your two copies also, you can send them along with Mrs. T's translation.

I will also appreciate it if, when your office has completed the grid map for the area we are interested in, you will let us have a copy. Then we shall be able, in future translations, to put in the coordinates after all positions given in code, saving you considerable trouble.

I am sending along herewith a couple of new translations pertaining to the Japanese air operations. In translating Capt SHIBATA'S diary notes covering the TAIWAN air battle, we endeavored to concentrate first on extracts which will help you in piecing together the overall picture of the air command set-up, the units involved, and their operational strength. In many places the notes are pretty hard to figure out (SHIBATA's strength figures seldom add up to the totals he gives), but I hope that they may prove useful in conjunction with other sources. We shall translate any other useful material contained in SHIBATA's diary (concerning searches, etc.) shortly.

The other translation is of a table appended to the Demobilization Bureau monograph covering LEYTE operations. My comments on this table are given in the Translator's Note on the cover page. The numerous question marks in the table are pretty indicative of what scanty statistical data the Japanese were able to find on their air strength. By itself, the table won't be of much use, but again it may prove helpful in conjunction with what other material we can assemble.

Colonel Hartman, head of the Historical Section in Tokyo, was in town last week and contacted me regarding the job out there. It sounded like an excellent assignment; however, inasmuch as my family would not be able to join me for at least six months due to the heavy backlog, I cannot consider accepting it. Hence, barring some entirely unforeseen development in this connection, I shall be sticking to Washington. I just wanted to let you know so that you and the Commodore wouldn't be expecting me to abandon the ship momentarily.

We are progressing with the 2AF basic orders and Fourth Air Army material.

Sincerely,

*Clark V. Kaurakami*

Incl - 2 document translations

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Rm 2517

CHK No. 27

26 October 1951

Commodore R.W. Bates, USN  
Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

Something has developed which requires your immediate attention. Captain Renken phoned Mrs. Tanaka just a few minutes ago and asked her to come over to his office this afternoon to receive some bad news. He indicated that it has to do with a "reduction in force", which of course can mean only one thing - that Mrs. Tanaka is being given notice of her release.

Of course I can do nothing about this since I have no administrative control over Mrs. Tanaka's job. I wonder, however, whether you were consulted before this action was decided upon. I am almost certain that you cannot have been, since if you had been, you would have let me know that Mrs. T's job was in danger.

In short, it looks to me like somebody is trying to pull a fast one, and I do hope that it is not too late for you to intervene and get something done about it. Canning Mrs. T now certainly isn't going to save anybody any money in the long run, for as long as you continue your project along present lines, that is, using Japanese sources for the Japanese side, the material will have to be translated by somebody sooner or later.

I can readily understand that the office carrying Mrs. T on its payroll at present, when confronted by the necessity of a reduction in force, would want to discard her first rather than someone actually in that office. Nevertheless, I hope that you will be able to find some solution that will permit Mrs. T's continued employment.

Sincerely,

*Clarke H. Kawakami*  
Clarke H. Kawakami

0303



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Rm 2517

CHK No. 28

2 November 1951

Commodore R.W. Bates, USN  
Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore:

I am sorry that I missed seeing you again before your departure. My entire family has been down with the 'flu for the past two weeks, and I finally succumbed to it too. Spent yesterday sweating out the fever in bed and feel a bit better today.

I am most grateful that you were able to keep the axe from falling on Mrs. Tanaka's neck. Her departure would have been a severe blow, for the mass of translation work required by your *modus operandi* is far greater than one person, no matter how competent and speedy, can handle in any reasonable period of time. I might mention that the list of sources we are translating is now far more extensive than the original list of documents which you submitted to CIA in order to get an estimate of translation time required.

I am forwarding herewith my pencil translation of part of the Fourth Air Army material. Mr. Rorie's yeoman, who had been doing our typing, has been transferred to sea duty, so we shall have to rely on your office to do most of the typing. Please be sure to return the pencil translation to me with the typed copies, so that I can copyread them and correct any errors in typing.

I am going right through the Fourth Air Army stuff, translating everything of an original documentary nature that is contained therein bearing on the air operations we are studying. You will note that Lt. Col. Sato's file of documents includes some covering the naval air forces involved. I am of course translating these as well as documents relating to the Fourth Air Army itself.

Mrs. Tanaka has just about finished her translation of the basic 2AF orders, and I shall send it along as soon as I can check it over. She will now go back to Capt. Shibata's diary and translate some of the material we omitted on the first go-through. There was some stuff on air searches which I think may be helpful to you.

If any questions arise in connection with the Fourth Air Army material, please let me know. Mrs. Tanaka also asks me to convey her appreciation of your prompt and effective intervention on her behalf.

Sincerely,

*Clarke H. Kawakami*  
Clarke H. Kawakami

Incl - 1 document translation

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.  
Rm 2515

IN REPLY REFER TO  
CHK No. 29  
19 Nov 1951

Captain J.J. Rochefort  
World War II Evaluation Group  
Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

Dear Captain Rochefort,

Received your letter of the 15th this morning just as I was preparing to send off to you another batch of translation from the SATO documents. First, I will answer your query as best I can.

The operational agreement between Fourth Air Army and First Air Fleet bore no date on it, and I am afraid that attempting to deduce the date from those of the adjacent documents on the microfilm will not work since it is obvious that the documents were arranged in other than their original order in Sato's file before being microfilmed. In other words, Sato's file of documents (I assume that it was a file of some kind) was not microfilmed just as it was. The documents were arranged or compiled by someone, possibly Sato himself or Col. Matsumae, another 4FA staff officer who compiled the 1st Demob Bureau's post-war monograph covering Fourth Air Army operations in this period. The compiler interspersed the documents with explanatory or supplementary statements written after the war and presumably based on his memory. The microfilm which I have includes the whole business, that is, the explanatory post-war statements and the original documents. It is very confusing material to work with, but generally speaking, I am able to identify the original documents, and it is these which I am endeavoring to pick out and translate for you. When I have occasion to refer to the other post-war stuff, I will clearly identify it as such so as to distinguish it from the original documents.

With regard to the date of the 4FA-LAF Agreement, the only clues are given in the post-war material, and they are very vague. Sato's explanatory statement preceding the agreement and the 4FA draft operations plan sheds virtually no light on the date of the agreement, though it is placed subsequent to the U.S. invasion of Morotai and Palau. In his statement Sato refers to the 4FA-LAF agreement before he refers to the 4FA draft operations plan, but there is no assurance that he is always handling things strictly in chronological order.

The 1st Demob Bureau monograph on Fourth Air Army operations is equally vague concerning the date of the agreement. I am forwarding you separately a photostated copy of the English version of this monograph, obtained from Army Historical Division, and you will find some explanation of the origin of the agreement on p. 28. About all that can be deduced from this explanation is that the 4FA-LAF agreement in question was drawn up (concluded) after the U.S. carrier strikes on the Philippines in late September, and that it represented a revision of an earlier agreement under which enemy task forces were to be taken care of by Navy air alone.

In the light of the above, I think it is pretty safe to assume that the

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agreement was concluded either late in September or in early October prior to the Fourth Air Army's Draft Operations Plan of 15 Oct. Please note that the 4FA plan clearly provides for the participation of Army aircraft in attacks on enemy task forces. This appears to be an implementation of the provisions of the 4FA-IAF agreement.

In any case, the agreement is definitely not a part of the Fourth Air Army draft plan. With regard to the latter, I ought to call to your attention that both the explanatory post-war notes on the Sato microfilm and the 1st Demob Bureau monograph on 4FA operations state (in identical language incidentally) that the draft operations plan of 15 Oct had not yet been finally approved by the Air Army commander when the SULUAN landing took place. It had been approved by the Air Army Chief of Staff, however, and had been communicated to the subordinate commands concerned and also been jointly studied with the principal staff officers of the 2nd Air Division. Consequently, these sources state, there was no difficulty generally in carrying out operations in accordance with the draft plan when the Leyte invasion ensued.

The above information concerning the draft operations plan appears on pp. 19 and 25 of the 1st Demob Bureau monograph, if you care to look at it yourself. As usual, the translation is atrocious and near-incomprehensible, and before sending you the monograph, I will correct these particular passages on the basis of the Japanese original text, which I also have. You will note that the monograph includes most of the documents which I have been translating from the SATO microfilm. However, it is impossible to tell from the monograph which documents are original wartime material, and further the translations are so faulty as to be unusable. That is why I have been translating everything directly from the SATO microfilm.

Now to get on to the stuff I am forwarding herewith, it contains some more Fourth Air Army operations orders between 13 and 21 Oct and some plans and operations orders of the 2nd Air Division down to the eve of the big air offensive of 24-25 Oct. One of the charts I had photostated here. The others I am sending in flimsy, and I hope you can reproduce them up there. This winds up all the material on the Sato microfilm which is pertinent to the air operations we are concerned with. Unfortunately, it is all plans and orders, with not a shred of information concerning the actual execution of the operations. As you will see, the 1st Demob Bureau monograph also has nothing on the operations themselves, except a table in the back (p. 117) purporting to show attack sorties and results from 19 Oct on.

I am now going to check over what Mrs. T has translated while I was engaged on the Fourth Air Army stuff, and will send it along as promptly as possible. I will then start barrelling away at the mass of detailed Navy air action reports covering the TAIWAN and PHILIPPINES battles.

Wishing the Commodore, yourself and Comdr Hartman a pleasant and well-fed Thanksgiving.

Sincerely,

*Charles V. Kawakami*

Incl. - MSS translation of various 4FA documents

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Rm 2515

CHK No. 30

23 Nov 1951

Commodore R. W. Bates, USN  
Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore,

I received your note of the 20th today and am returning herewith the portion of manuscript you requested.

My pencil notes, giving what information I have thus far discovered regarding the points on which you made queries, are attached to the individual pages which they concern. Further data, I hope, will turn up later in regard to various points on which I don't have much as yet. Now that we have more or less completed the task of going back to translate material on the basic air planning and organization of the air forces, we shall be able to proceed with the translation of documents covering the actual operations. Undoubtedly, this material will provide answers to at least some of your queries.

Sincerely,

*Clarke H. Kawakami*  
Clarke H. Kawakami

Incl. - pp. 17-54, Leyte Battle Analysis MSS

(see Comm. to Leg. Mr. K. Fowler)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Rm 2515

CHK No. 31

December 6, 1951

Captain J.J. Rochefort  
U.S. Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Captain Rochefort,

Roger is leaving for Newport tonight and will be dropping in on you up there, so I am asking him to take along another batch of translation manuscript which I hope your office can type up.

The extremely voluminous 6 FGB Operations Order No. 6, of 5 Sep, appears to be the basic order of that command covering the SHO Operations. Unfortunately, only this order and OpOrd No. 13, of 27 Sep, appear on the Army Hist Div microfilm.

As you will gather from the appearance of the manuscript, these orders were extremely rough going for Mrs. Tanaka, and even my checking of the translation required considerable time. I am quite firmly convinced that the Japanese would have had a better chance of winning the war if they had been able to draw up somewhat more concise and intelligible orders. They must have had to use a lot of intuition to figure out exactly what headquarters wanted them to do.

I am now checking some more translations completed by Mrs. T, including the remainder of Capt. Shibata's diary, and will be sending them on for typing shortly. I now have her extracting and translating all the 6FGB orders (mainly DesOpOrds) which she can find in the message-log sections of various air unit war diaries.

With regard to your query concerning further data on searches, the remaining portion of Shibata's diary will, I think, supply some. I will also be sending you shortly a translation of the 25th Air Flot War Diary for October, which shows on what days air searches were flown from Okinawa, though no details whatever are given. I shall check and see whether there is any more search data in other documents for the period through 17 October. On Army searches, unfortunately, there is nothing.

I am highly curious to see what comes out of Tokyo in the way of new material. I hope it doesn't turn out to be the same old stuff from the Historical Division out there.

Roger will report to you and the Commodore on how things are going down here. Very best wishes to you all.

Sincerely,

*Charles H. Kawakami*  
Charles H. Kawakami

Incl. - Jap. document translation

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Rm 2515

IN REPLY REFER TO

CHK No. 32

Commodore R.W. Bates, USN  
Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Commodore:

I am forwarding you herewith a couple more translations, one already typed and the other in pencil manuscript. The latter is the remainder of Capt. Shibata's diary, the first part of which was sent up to you previously. Captain Rochefort will find in it quite a bit of the added data on searches which he desires.

The other translation, I think, you will also find useful. It is about the only authentic Japanese high-level intelligence estimate that we have for the period we are concerned with. It is an original Combined Fleet wartime document. The only other available material on what the Japanese High Command expected us to do next in Sep-Oct 1944 is post-surrender stuff and consequently to be taken with a grain of salt. It does appear from this document, however, that the Japanese had our intentions pretty well figured out.

Roger told me of his visit with you and Captain Rochefort, and communicated your good wishes for the impending holiday season, which I sincerely reciprocate. I trust that your trip to California will be a pleasant one.

Roger tells me that you don't agree with my contention that the SHO Operations were more than defensive in character. My view is based on a pretty thorough study of the entire development of the SHO plans from their inception, but of course this is a matter of interpretation on which opinions may differ. Also, my view is based strictly on the plans themselves without being influenced by the way they actually turned out in execution. Even though, in fact, the SHO Operation failed even to constitute an effective defense of the PHILIPPINES, the fact remains that the Japanese, in their plans, wishfully aimed at not only defending the Philippines but administering to us so serious a defeat as to decisively turn the tide of the war in the Pacific.

Sincerely,

*Clarke H. Kawakami*  
Clarke H. Kawakami

Encl - 2 Jap. document translations

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Rm 2515

CHK No. 33

14 Dec 1951

Captain J. J. Rochefort, USN  
U.S. Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Captain Rochefort,

I am forwarding you herewith a translation of the War Diary of the 25th Air Flotilla for October 1944. As you already know from the material previously furnished you regarding naval air force organization, 25th Air Flot functioned as the command of Western Attack Force 2 in the NANSEI SHOTO area, under Sixth Base Air Force.

The summary of operations isn't very helpful as it gives no detailed data on searches or patrols. The communications log, on the other hand, contains quite a bit of the search data not given in the operations summary, as well as a lot of other valuable information, i.e., 6 FGB and W2AB orders, battle reports, etc. In the battle reports, you will find some details concerning aircraft losses suffered in the 10 Oct strike.

As I reported in my letter to the Commodore the other day, we are presently departing from our customary method of translating document by document, and instead we are extracting from a slew of different reports (message logs) all the 6FGB orders and staff directives we can find. This will enable you to proceed immediately with the compilation of all the available orders issued by this command. In fact, we shall do most of the compiling for you by arranging them chronologically instead of by document. Source citation will be given for each individual order.

*next to* — It is confusing, to say the least, to follow the changes in tactical organization of the 6FGB forces. New "Western Attack Forces" appear out of the blue, like Western Attack Force O. Then there is an ungodly conglomeration of shudan, rengo shudan, kogeki shudan, and God knows what all. Differentiation of these in translation is a neat trick. Sometimes it is ~~isn't~~ possible, as for example in the case of the rengo kokutai or Combined Air Gp, which is a regular administrative unit, and the rengo shudan, which also has to be translated as "combined group" but which is a tactical force. Fortunately, the only rengo kokutai that we run across is the 14th on Taiwan. There is also a 14th rengo shudan, which we are translating as 14th Combined Group (leaving out "Air" in an effort to distinguish it from the 14th Combined Air Gp on Taiwan.

I trust that you and your family will have a most enjoyable Christmas, not burdened with thoughts of whether the SHO No. 1 Operation was offensive or defensive, of how many plane reinforcements reached SHINCHIKU on the night of 14 Oct, or of shudan, rengo shudan, rengo kokutai, etc. I am getting so that I talk about this stuff in my sleep.

Sincerely,

*Charles H. Kewell*

Incl - Jap. document translation

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